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ABSTRACT
Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Know How the Economy Works?
by Johan Lagerlöf* *
This paper concerns public policy and welfare in a society where citizens’ preferences
over public policy depend, in varying degrees, on some unknown state of the world.
That is, people are heterogenous with respect to their responsiveness to the unknown
state. Public policy is decided on by a policymaker who is elected among the citizens by
majority vote. Given this framework it is asked whether the citizens would be better off
if the amount of uncertainty that the policymaker is facing were smaller. Among the
results is that those who are sufficiently responsive to the unknown state may be worse
off if the variance of the stochastic variable decreases.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Geht es uns besser, wenn unsere Politiker wissen, wie die Wirtschaft funktioniert?
Diese Arbeit untersucht staatliche Politik und Wohlfahrt in einer Gesellschaft, in der die
von den Bürgern bevorzugte staatliche Politik in unterschiedlichem Maße von der
Unsicherheit der Systemzustände abhängt. Die Menschen sind heterogen hinsichtlich
ihrer Akzeptanz der Unsicherheit. Die staatliche Politik wird durch einen Gesetzgeber
geregelt, der unter den Bürgern durch Mehrheitsbeschluß gewählt wurde. Unter
Annahme dieser Bedingungen wird untersucht, ob es den Bürgern besser gehen würde,
wenn das Maß an Unsicherheit, dem der Gesetzgeber begegnet, kleiner wäre. Die
Resultate zeigen u. a., daß es jenen, die eine ausreichende Akzeptanz des defizitären
Wissenszustandes besitzen, schlechter gehen kann, wenn die Varianz der stochastischen
Variablen abnimmt.
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with public policy and welfare in a society where citizens’
preferences over public policy depend, in varying degrees, on some unknown state
of the world. That is, people are heterogenous with respect to their responsiveness
to the unknown state: whereas some citizens’ ideal public policy depends strongly
on the true state, others’ ideal policy is much less state dependent. Public policy
is decided on by a policymaker who is elected among the citizens by majority vote.
Given this setup the questions are posed whether the citizens would be better or
worse o¤ ex ante (i) if the policymaker had access to more information about the
state of the world and (ii) if the randomness in the state of the world were lower.
One example of a story which …ts into the above setup is the following. People
have preferences over a public good (roads, say) and a public bad (pollution),
and these have di¤erent weights in di¤erent citizens’ utility functions. An elected
policymaker decides directly only on the amount of roads. Indirectly, however,
this decision a¤ects also the amount of pollution: More roads give rise to more
pollution. The exact relationship between the amount of roads and pollution
is unknown though. Together, each citizen’s utility function and the stochastic
relationship between roads and pollution give rise to induced preferences over
roads only. Those citizens who care relatively more about the amount of pollution
(the “environmentalists”) will be more responsive to changes in the unknown
stochastic variable.
Another example concerns monetary policy.1 Citizens have preferences over
in‡ation and employment, although the relative weight on these two issues dif-
fer among them. An elected policymaker sets the rate of in‡ation directly; the
level of employment is a¤ected indirectly if the actual in‡ation di¤ers from the
expected in‡ation. The level of employment is also a¤ected by some external
shock, the exact magnitude of which is unknown by the policymaker when setting
the in‡ation. The stochastic relationship between in‡ation and employment (the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve) together with a citizen’s preferences over
in‡ation and employment give rise to induced preferences over in‡ation only; and
for those citizens for which employment is relatively more important (for those
less “conservative” in Rogo¤’s (1985) terminology), the ideal in‡ation level will
1There is an extensive literature on credibility in monetary policy which uses a modeling
framework that is compatible with this example and the analysis in Section 5 of the paper. This
literature was initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), and it
is surveyed by e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1990).
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depend to a greater extent on the stochastic variable.
Concerning the two examples above one may ask oneself two questions. First,
would all people in the economy be better o¤ (ex ante) if the policymaker had
more information about the relationship between roads and pollution respectively
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve? The analysis of this paper shows
that this is not the case. Given that “more information” is understood as a
more informative signal about the realization of the stochastic variable,2 only
those members of the society who are su¢ciently responsive to the stochastic
variable gain from the policymaker’s having more information. Those who are
not su¢ciently responsive — in the sense that they only to a small extent care
about pollution respectively in‡ation — would be worse o¤ if the policymaker had
access to a more informative signal.
Second, would all people in the economy be better o¤ (ex ante) if the ran-
domness in the relationship between roads and pollution respectively in‡ation
and employment decreased? The analysis of the paper shows that if a decrease
in randomness is understood as a smaller variance of the stochastic variable and
if the policymaker can improve upon the informativeness of the signal that he
observes by making a greater e¤ort, then those who are su¢ciently responsive
(i.e., the environmentalists respectively the “liberals”) may be worse o¤ from a
lower variance. The reason for this is that the environmentalists and the liberals
want the policymaker to make a great e¤ort, thereby getting access to a more
informative signal. However, a lower variance of the stochastic variable induces
the policymaker to make a smaller e¤ort.
It is important to note that the question whether people in the economy would
be better o¤ if the policymaker had access to more information is quite di¤erent
from the question whether additional information would be good for the poli-
cymaker himself. It is well known that a player in a non-zero sum game can
be worse o¤ from having more information; for examples of this phenomenon in
a political framework, see Reed (1989) or, in a Cournot duopoly setting, Sakai
(1985). This …nding is perhaps more surprising than the result that others than
the policymaker may be worse o¤. Nevertheless, the latter result may be at least
as important. One example of a …eld where this kind of result is of signi…cance
is the literature on informational lobbying (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Pot-
2More precisely, in the analysis that follows, “more information” will be understood as an
increase in the square of the correlation coe¢cient between the signal and the unknown stochastic
variable.
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ters and van Winden, 1992).3 This literature takes as its point of departure that
lobbyists have access to information that is relevant to the politician in his policy
making. Hence, by strategically transmitting this information to the policymaker,
the lobbyists may be able to in‡uence public policy. Typically, in the equilibria of
the models in this literature, at least some information is transmitted to the poli-
cymaker. A welfare analysis of the lobbyist’s opportunity to lobby then amounts
to asking whether the policymaker’s having access to this information induces him
to make decisions which are better to people in the society.4
Besides studying the welfare e¤ects of a policymaker’s being better informed
and of a decrease in the randomness of the state of the world, this paper also
considers another question, namely the relation between the policymaker’s and
the electorate’s degree of responsiveness. One of the few papers in the literature
which explicitly models this kind of heterogeneity is Schultz (1996). In his model
the electorate is homogenous with regard to the degree of responsiveness, but the
two political parties di¤er from the electorate in that they are less responsive.5
This di¤erence between the electorate and the parties is exogenous to Schultz’s
analysis. However, Schultz shows that if such a di¤erence exists and if one con-
siders a dynamic environment with incomplete information about the incumbent
party’s preferences, then more polarization (i.e., a greater di¤erence between the
parties’ preferences) makes the electorate worse o¤. Since this result is driven by
the assumption that candidates are less responsive than the electorate, one may
wonder what could give rise to such a di¤erence.
If public policy concerns the rate of in‡ation, then one reason for the electorate
to delegate the formulation of public policy to a policymaker that is less responsive
than the median voter can be found in the existing literature on credibility in
monetary policy (see the references in footnote 1 above). Rogo¤ (1985) shows
that the in‡ationary bias that arises in the models in this literature may be
mitigated if the task of conducting monetary policy is delegated to someone more
conservative. However, a policymaker that is more conservative in the sense of
Rogo¤ is also less responsive in the sense of Schultz. Hence, if monetary policy
is conducted by a politician who is elected by the electorate, then the di¤erence
between the politician and the electorate that is postulated by Schultz should
arise endogenously.6
3Two recent surveys can be found in Austen-Smith (1997) and Sloof (1997).
4This question is also studied in Lagerlöf (1997). The present paper extends that analysis.
5Similar assumptions are made in Martinelli (1997) and Martinelli and Matsui (1997).
6In Rogo¤’s model it is a benevolent government — not an electorate — that appoints the
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The present paper models this mechanism together with another mechanism
which has not, to my knowledge, been studied in the previous literature and which
may also lead to a di¤erence in the degree of responsiveness between the policy-
maker and the electorate. However, the other mechanism leads the policymaker
to be more responsive than the median voter. The mechanism works like this.
Suppose that the policymaker, after having taken o¢ce but before having decided
on public policy, observes a noisy signal about the realization of the stochastic
variable. Moreover, by making a costly e¤ort, the policymaker can improve upon
the informativeness of the signal. If so, voters may have an incentive to delegate
the task of deciding on public policy to a policymaker who is more responsive
since such a person has a greater incentive to make an e¤ort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2, 3, and
4, I consider a model compatible with the environmental story told above. In
Section 2, the basic model, where the signal’s informativeness is exogenous, is
presented. In Section 3, this model is analyzed and the …rst results are stated.
Section 4 studies an extension of the model where the signal’s informativeness is
endogenous. In Section 5 I consider a slightly di¤erent model which is compatible
with the monetary policy story told above. Section 6 brie‡y summarizes and
concludes. Proofs are found in an appendix.
2. The basic model
Consider a society with a continuum of citizens each having preferences over two
public goods, provided in quantities ¼ and x. Citizen i ’s preferences are described
by the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function
Ui (¼; x) = ¡ (¼ ¡ ¼)2 ¡ ¸i (x¡ x)2 ; (0.1)
where ¼, x, and ¸i are …xed parameters. The citizens di¤er from each other only
with regard to the parameter ¸i. The distribution of ¸i among the citizens is
described by a cumulative probability distribution function G whith support <+.
The (…nite) mean and the median of ¸i are denoted by ¸ and ¸m, respectively.
Public policy is decided on by a policymaker. The policymaker can control
only ¼. However, there is a stochastic relationship between ¼ and x, given by
x = ¯¼ ¡ ": (0.2)
policymaker/central banker. For models where the policymaker deciding on monetary policy is
elected, see Alesina and Grilli (1992), Björnerstedt (1995), and Waller and Walsh (1996).
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Here ¯ > 0 is a …xed parameter and " is a stochastic variable with zero mean.
The model is compatible with the …rst example given in the introduction.7 That
is, we may think of ¼ as the amount of roads in a country, and x as the amount
of pollution caused by the tra¢c on these roads (or perhaps rather the adverse
environmental e¤ects of the pollution). Everybody has some ideal amount of
roads, ¼, and some ideal amount of pollution, x. The uncertainty as to the exact
relationship between the amount of roads and pollution may be due to the fact
that the technology giving rise to the relationship is not perfectly known, or to
the fact that the amount of pollution also depends on weather conditions which
vary in an unpredictable manner.
Substituting (0.2) into (0.1) yields citizen i ’s induced preferences over ¼ only:
ui (¼; ") = ¡ (¼ ¡ ¼)2 ¡ ¸i (¯¼ ¡ "¡ x)2
= ¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ [¼ ¡ Ã (¸i) ¡ ' (¸i) "]2 ¡ ¸i (¯¼ + "+ x)2
1 + ¸i¯
2 ; (0.3)
where
Ã (¸i) =
¼ + ¸i¯x
1 + ¸i¯
2 (0.4)
and
' (¸i) =
¸i¯
1 + ¸i¯
2 : (0.5)
This means that if " were known, citizen i would like the policymaker to set ¼
equal to b¼ = Ã (¸i) + ' (¸i) ": (0.6)
Hence, since ' (0) = 0 and '
0
> 0, the parameter ¸i measures how responsive
a citizen is to changes in ". Someone who has a low ¸i (i.e., someone who does
not care much about pollution) would like the policymaker to make b¼ contingent
on " to a lesser degree than someone for whom ¸i is large. In the following, the
parameter ¸i will often be called citizen i ’s responsiveness parameter.
The policymaker is elected among the citizens by majority vote. More speci…-
cally, in a political equilibrium, the policymaker is a citizen having a responsiveness
parameter ¸i such that he cannot be beaten in a pair-wise comparison when each
citizen votes for the one of the two candidates that gives him the highest expected
7The preferences in equation (0.1) are also compatible with the second example (the one
on monetary policy). However, the stochastic relationship between ¼ and x, given by equation
(0.2), does not …t that story.
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utility. Hence, like all other citizens, the policymaker has preferences according
to equation (0.1), and these will govern his choice of ¼; he cannot commit himself
to any electoral platform other than his ideal policy.
Concerning the informational structure and the timing of events, the following
is assumed. First the policymaker is elected. The stochastic variable " cannot be
observed by anyone, neither before nor after the elections. However, after having
taken o¢ce, the policymaker observes a signal s, which is correlated with ". Then
the policymaker decides on ¼. All citizens’ preferences are known by all citizens.
Let F be the joint cumulative distribution function of " and s, with density
f . The following notation is used:
¹s = E (s) ; (0.7)
¾2 = V ar (") ; (0.8)
¾2s = V ar (s) ; (0.9)
and
½ =
Cov ("; s)
¾¾s
: (0.10)
(Recall that the expected value of " equals zero, E (") = 0.) ½ 2 [¡1; 1] is thus
the correlation coe¢cient between s and ".
The policymaker is assumed to be a Bayesian updater. Thus, after having
observed the signal s, the policymaker’s beliefs about " are described by the
conditional density function f (" j s), de…ned by
f (" j s) = f ("; s)
f (s)
; (0.11)
where f (s) =
R1
¡1 f ("; s) d" is the marginal density of s. The conditional expec-
tation function is de…ned by E (" j s) = R "f (" j s) d". Assume that F is such
that " has linear regression with regard to s, i.e., that E (" j s) is a linear (a¢ne)
function of s.8 It is well known that if " has linear regression with regard to s
(and if E (") = 0), then
E (" j s) = ½ ¾
¾s
(s ¡ ¹s) : (0.12)
8For instance, a bivariate normal distribution has this property.
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3. Beginning the analysis
Let us denote the policymaker’s responsiveness parameter by ¸g (where g stands
for government). At the last stage, conditional on his having observed the signal
s, the policymaker will implement the policy ¼ which maximizes his expected
utility:
max
¼
Z
ug (¼; ") f (" j s) d": (0.13)
The unique solution to this problem is given by
¼¤g = Ã (¸g) + ' (¸g)E (" j s) : (0.14)
Now consider a citizen/voter. At the time of the elections, this person only
knows the prior distribution of s and ". However, he anticipates that a policymaker
with responsiveness parameter ¸g will set ¼ equal to ¼¤g. Hence, citizen i ’s expected
utility at the time of the elections, denoted by Eui, may be written as
Eui =
Z Z
ui
¡
¼¤g; "
¢
f ("; s) d"ds
= ¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢Ã (¸g) [Ã (¸g)¡ 2Ã (¸i)]
¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ ½2¾2' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)]
¡¼2 ¡ ¸i
¡
x2 + ¾2
¢
: (0.15)
The expression after the second equality sign in equation (0.15) was obtained by
using equations (0.3), (0.12), (0.14), and by carrying out some algebra.
Eui represents citizen i ’s preferences over a potential policymaker. The po-
tential policymakers di¤er from each other along only one dimension, ¸g 2 [0;1).
Moreover, in the proof of Lemma 1 below it is shown that Eui is single peaked in
¸g. Hence, we can invoke the median voter theorem (see e.g. Mueller, 1989), which
states that if those two conditions (i.e., one dimension and single-peakedness) are
met then the median voter’s favorite policymaker cannot lose under majority rule.
This means that, in a political equilibrium, the policymaker will be a citizen pre-
ferred by the median citizen/voter. Not surprisingly, the responsiveness parameter
of this preferred citizen equals the median voter’s, ¸g = ¸m; there is no reason for
any member of the electorate to delegate the task of deciding on public policy to
someone with other preferences than the member himself.
Lemma 1. The policymaker’s responsiveness parameter is the same as the me-
dian citizen’s, ¸g = ¸m.
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Let us now investigate whether members of the society would be better o¤
if the policymaker had access to a more informative signal about the stochastic
variable ". The welfare evaluation will be made ex ante; that is, I will consider
citizen i ’s expected utility, as measured by Eui in equation (0.15) (with ¸g = ¸m).
The expression “more informative signal” will be understood as an increase in ½2.
Let e¸ be de…ned by e¸ = ¸m
2 + ¸m¯
2 : (0.16)
Proposition 1. An increase in ½2 bene…ts those with ¸i > e¸ and makes those
with ¸i < e¸ worse o¤ (i.e., @Eui@½2 j¸g=¸mR 0 as ¸i R e¸).
Accordingly, those members of the electorate who have a su¢ciently low re-
sponsiveness parameter ¸i are worse o¤ if the policymaker has access to better
information about the relationship between ¼ and x, in the sense that ½2 is larger.9
Before looking at the intuition for this result, let us consider the question whether
a majority of the citizens may be worse o¤ from an increase in ½2. Since e¸ < ¸m=2
(see equation 0.16), it follows immediately that the answer to this question is no:
Everyone with a responsiveness parameter ¸i 2 [¸m=2;1) is strictly better o¤
from a larger ½2, and this group of citizens form a majority.
However, it may be that a social welfare function that assigns an equal weight
to the expected utility of all citizens is decreasing in ½2. Let EW be de…ned by
EW =
Z 1
0
EuidG (¸i) : (0.17)
Since the expression for Eui in equation (0.15) is a linear (a¢ne) function of ¸i
(cf. the …rst line of equation (0.3)), EW is obtained by simply substituting ¸ (i.e.,
the responsiveness parameter of the average citizen) for ¸i in equation (0.15):
EW = ¡ ¡1 + ¸¯2¢Ã (¸g) £Ã (¸g)¡ 2Ã ¡¸¢¤
¡ ¡1 + ¸¯2¢ ½2¾2' (¸g) £' (¸g)¡ 2' ¡¸¢¤
¡¼2 ¡ ¸ ¡x2 + ¾2¢ : (0.18)
9The result in Proposition 1 is related to a result in Lagerlöf (1997). In that paper, however,
the identity of the policymaker is exogenous, and the di¤erences in responsiveness between
citizens is not — as in this paper — derived from di¤erences in the relative weights on two policy
issues and the stochastic relationship between them. Also, in Lagerlöf (1997) the stochastic
variable has a Bernoulli distribution.
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For EW to be decreasing in ½2, the distribution G must be su¢ciently skewed to
the right, so that ¸m is to a su¢cient extent greater than ¸. If so, it might be
that ¸ < e¸.
In order to understand the intuition behind the result that those citizens hav-
ing a low responsiveness parameter are worse o¤ if ½2 is larger, let us consider
the extreme case where ¸i = 0. Such a citizen only cares about ¼, and he does
not want the policy to be conditioned on " at all. Instead, his ideal policy always
equals ¼ (cf. equation (0.6)). Now consider a policymaker having a responsiveness
parameter ¸g > 0. If this policymaker can observe a signal about the realization
of ", then he will condition his decision on the signal, and thus make the decision
¼¤g = Ã (¸g) + ' (¸g)E (" j s) : (0.19)
From an ex ante perspective this means that the decision will vary, since the
citizen observes the signal only ex post. If the policymaker could not observe the
signal, then he would make the decision
e¼¤g = Ã (¸g) : (0.20)
Clearly this decision will not vary.
Let us decompose the citizen’s gain from the policymaker’s not having access
to the signal into two parts: (i) the gain the citizen would obtain if he were risk
neutral and (ii) the gain that is due to the citizen’s being risk averse. If the citizen
were risk neutral, he would only care about the expected policy. However, it is
easy to see that the expected policy is the same regardless of the policymaker’s
having access to the signal or not:10
Es
¡
¼¤g
¢
= Es [Ã (¸g) + ' (¸g)E (" j s)] = Ã (¸g) : (0.21)
Hence, the gain the citizen would obtain if he were risk neutral equals zero, and his
total gain from the policymaker’s not having access to the signal must exclusively
be attributed to the citizen’s being risk averse. But the citizen’s being risk averse
manifests itself in his not wanting any variation in the policymaker’s decision.
Thus the citizen’s gain from the policymaker’s not having access to the signal is
always positive. The same is true for citizens having a responsiveness parameter
¸i that is strictly positive but still relatively small (smaller than e¸).11
10This is due to the quadratic functional form.
11The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is related to the intuition for a result in Freixas
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Before …nishing this section, let us consider the question whether all citizens
would be better o¤ ex ante if ¾2, the variance of ", were lower. Not surprisingly, it
turns out that this is indeed the case. However, in the next section the model will
be expanded by making the informativeness of the signal that the policymaker
observes endogenous, and in that model a smaller variance may be harmful. This
…nding will be easier to understand in light of the result stated in the following
observation, which assumes that the signal’s informativeness is exogenous.
Observation 1. All citizens are always better o¤ from a lower variance of "
(i.e., @Eui
@¾2
j¸g=¸m< 0 for all ¸i).
4. The signal’s informativeness being endogenous
In this section it is assumed that the policymaker can make a costly e¤ort and
thereby improve upon the informativeness of the signal that he observes. The
informational structure and the timing of events in this extension of the model
is as follows. First the policymaker is elected. After having taken o¢ce, the
policymaker …rst decides on an e¤ort level e. Then he observes the signal s,
which is correlated with ". Finally the policymaker decides on ¼. The stochastic
variable " cannot be directly observed by anyone, neither before nor after the
elections.
It is assumed that e ´ ½2, where as before ½ is the correlation coe¢cient be-
tween s and "; hence e 2 [0; 1]. Thus, by making a greater e¤ort, the policymaker
can improve upon the informativeness of the signal. However, making an e¤ort is
costly for the policymaker; the disutility that he incurs from exerting e¤ort level
e equals C (e), where C
0
> 0 and C
00
> 0, with C
0
(0) = 0.
and Kihlstrom (1984). They consider a situation in which a patient must choose a doctor in the
face of imperfect information about the distribution of service quality across doctors. In par-
ticular they study the e¤ect of risk aversion on demand for information about this distribution.
They write (p. 93): “On this issue, intuition is inconclusive since it suggests that the …nal e¤ect
is a combination of two con‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, more risk-averse decision-makers
should have a stronger preference for the ex post reduction in uncertainty accomplished by ac-
quiring information. But uncertainty is reduced only ex post, i.e. only after the informative
message has been received. When the decision to buy information is made, the buyer does not
yet know whether he will receive good news or bad when the information arrives. Thus, ex ante,
the returns to information are uncertain, and more risk averse buyers should be less willing
to accept the risks associated with its acquisition.” Freixas and Kihlstrom …nd that, in their
model, an increase in the degree of risk aversion unambiguously reduces information demand.
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Let Eeug denote the policymaker’s expected utility at the stage where he is to
decide on the e¤ort level e. It follows from the expression for Eui in equation
(0.15) that Eeug may be written as
Eeug = ¡1 + ¸g¯2¢ £Ã2 (¸g) + e¾2'2 (¸g)¤ ¡ ¼2 ¡ ¸g ¡x2 + ¾2¢ ¡ C (e) ; (0.22)
where the last term is the postulated cost of information acquisition.12 The pol-
icymaker solves the problem of maximizing Eeug in equation (0.22) with respect
to e, subject to the constraint e 2 [0; 1]. Throughout I shall assume that this
problem has an interior solution.13 This interior solution, e¤, is implicitly de…ned
by
C
0
(e¤) ´ ¯
2¾2¸2g
1 + ¸g¯
2 : (0.23)
Note for future use that
@e¤
@¸g
=
¯2¾2¸g
¡
2 + ¸g¯
2
¢
C 00 (e¤)
¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢2 > 0 (0.24)
and
@e¤
@¾2
=
¯2¸2g
C 00 (e¤)
¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢ > 0: (0.25)
That is, as expected, a policymaker who cares more about the environment (has
a larger ¸g) makes a greater e¤ort to learn about how much the environment is
adversely a¤ected by building roads. Similarly, a larger variance of the stochastic
variable also induces the policymaker to make a greater e¤ort.
Let ´ be de…ned by
´ =
C
00
(e¤) e¤
C 0 (e¤)
; (0.26)
12Note that the gross value of information (i.e., Eeug if not counting the cost C (e)) is linear
in e = ½2. However, if we had assumed that e = ½, then the gross value of information would
have been a convex function of e. This phenomenon is closely related to a result in Radner
and Stiglitz (1984). They show that for an important class of decision problems, the value of
information is nonconcave. In particular, see their …rst example where they consider a linear
prediction problem.
13The problem has an interior solution if the Inada condition lime!1 C
0
(e) = 1 holds or if
this limit is …nite and ¸g < ¸c, where ¸c is de…ned by ¸
2
c¯
2¾2 ´ ¡1 + ¸c¯2¢C 0 (1). An example
of such a cost function is C (e) =
¡
1 ¡ p1 ¡ e¢2. The reason why I do not simply assume that
this Inada condition holds is that, when studying some examples later in this section, it will be
convenient to let C (e) = ea for a > 1.
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and let Z = e¤
³
1 + 1
´
´
. By using equations (0.23) and (0.25), one may show that
1
´
=
@e¤
@¾2
¾2
e¤
: (0.27)
Hence, ´ not only measures the curvature of the cost function C, but is also equal
to the inverse of the elasticity of information demand with respect to ¾2.
Now consider again a citizen/voter with responsiveness parameter ¸i. His
expected utility if the policymaker has a responsiveness parameter ¸g and ac-
cordingly exerts e¤ort e¤ (¸g) is denoted by Eeui, and it is obtained by simply
substituting e¤ for ½2 in equation (0.15):
Eeui = ¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢Ã (¸g) [Ã (¸g)¡ 2Ã (¸i)]
¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ e¤¾2' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)]
¡¼2 ¡ ¸i
¡
x2 + ¾2
¢
: (0.28)
Eeui thus represents i ’s induced preferences over a potential policymaker. Again,
for the median voter theorem to hold, these preferences must be single peaked in
¸g. In the Appendix I show that su¢cient conditions for this are that C (e) = ea,
a 2 ¡1; 3
2
¢
, x 6= ¯¼, and that ¾2 is su¢ciently close to zero. Here, I will con…ne
myself with showing that when Eeui is single peaked in ¸g, then the policymaker’s
responsiveness parameter does not necessarily equal the median voter’s.
To see this, let us di¤erentiate Eeui with respect to ¸g and evaluate at ¸i = ¸m:
@Eeui
@¸g
j ¸i=¸m = ¡2
¡
1 + ¸m¯
2
¢
Ã
0
(¸g) [Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸m)]
¡2 ¡1 + ¸m¯2¢ e¤¾2'0 (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸m)]
¡ ¡1 + ¸m¯2¢ ¾2' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸m)] @e¤
@¸g
: (0.29)
When Eeui is single peaked, then the median voter theorem applies, and in a
political equilibrium the policymaker will be the favorite of the median voter.
That is, ¸g will be such that the right-hand side of equation (0.29) equals zero.
Now suppose that @e
¤
@¸g
= 0. It follows immediately from equation (0.29) that then
the result from Lemma 1 is reobtained, ¸g = ¸m. However, if @e
¤
@¸g
> 0, then we
must have ¸g > ¸m. This can seen by evaluating (0.29) at ¸g = ¸m:
@Eeui
@¸g
j¸i=¸g=¸m=
¡
1 + ¸m¯
2
¢
¾2 [' (¸m)]
2 @e
¤
@¸g
j¸g=¸m : (0.30)
13
Since this expression is strictly positive, it must be that ¸g > ¸m. The intuition
for this result is clear. A policymaker who cares more about the environment
will make a greater e¤ort …nding information about the environmental e¤ects of
building roads, and it will be in the median voter’s interest that the policymaker
has access to such information. Thus, the median voter can gain by delegating
the task of deciding on public policy to somebody that cares more about the
environment than himself.14
Let us now turn to the question whether a citizen would be better or worse
o¤ if ¾2, the variance of ", were smaller.
Proposition 2. Suppose that 2¯Z' (¸g) · 1. Then a decrease in ¾2 (strictly)
bene…ts all citizens. Suppose that 2¯Z' (¸g) > 1. Then a decrease in ¾2
(strictly) bene…ts citizen i if and only if
' (¸i) <
¯Z [' (¸g)]
2
2¯Z' (¸g)¡ 1 : (0.31)
Inequality (0.31) does not need to hold when the condition 2¯Z' (¸g) > 1 is
met. That is, it may be that a citizen is worse o¤ if the variance of " is smaller.
To illustrate this I will consider two numerical examples. In both of them it is
assumed that C (e) = ea, for a > 1. This implies that
e¤ =
"
¯2¾2¸2g
a
¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢# 1a¡1 (0.32)
and that
Z =
ae¤
a¡ 1 : (0.33)
Now consider the …rst example.
Example 1. ¯ = ¸g = 1, a = 32 , and ¾
2 = 5
2
.
Given the parameter values speci…ed in Example 1, we get e¤ = 25
36
, Z = 25
12
,
' (¸g) =
1
2
, and ' (¸i) = ¸i1+¸i . Hence, 2¯Z' (¸g) =
25
12
> 1; and condition (0.31)
now becomes
¸i
1 + ¸i
<
25
52
, ¸i < 25
27
: (0.34)
14For another example of strategic delegation in a political context, see Persson and Tabellini
(1994).
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Thus, all citizens with a responsiveness parameter larger than ¸i = 2527 are strictly
worse o¤ if the variance decreases. In order to understand the intuition for this
result, let us decompose the total welfare e¤ect of a decrease in the variance into
two parts: the e¤ect on welfare which arises in the hypothetical case that the
signal’s informativeness is given; and the e¤ect that is due to the informativeness
actually being chosen by the policymaker. In Section 3 (Observation 1) we saw
that the …rst part always is positive. Concerning the second e¤ect, note that if the
variance decreases, this will induce the policymaker to make a smaller e¤ort and
thus get access to a less informative signal. This comparative statics result follows
from equation (0.25). From Section 3 (Proposition 1), however, we know that,
everything else being equal, those citizens having a su¢ciently large responsiveness
parameter are worse o¤ from a less informative signal. Hence, for those citizens,
the second is e¤ect is negative. The algebra shows that the second e¤ect may in
fact be stronger than the …rst e¤ect, making the most responsive citizens worse
o¤ from a lower variance of the stochastic variable.
Example 1 shows that also a citizen with the same responsiveness parameter
as the policymaker, ¸i = ¸g = 1, may be worse o¤ from a lower variance. My
second example helps us understand what is required for this particular result to
obtain.
Example 2. ¸i = ¸g.
Condition (0.31) now becomes
Z <
1
¸i¯
2 + 1: (0.35)
Thus, a necessary condition for a voter with the same responsiveness parameter
as the policymaker to be worse o¤ from a lower variance is that Z > 1.15 This
highlights the point that essential for our result that some citizens may be worse o¤
from a lower variance is that the magnitude of 1=´, the policymaker’s elasticity
of information demand with respect to ¾2, is su¢ciently great. This is in line
with our intuition: The reason why a larger ¾2 may be good is that it induces the
policymaker to make a greater e¤ort.
15The condition 2¯Z' (¸g) > 1 is automatically satis…ed if Z > 1¸i¯2 + 1, since, if ¸g = ¸i,
the former condition can be rewritten as 2Z > 1
¸i¯2
+ 1.
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5. Monetary policy with rational expectations
In this section I consider a model of credibility in monetary policy. The model
is only slightly di¤erent from the one described and analyzed in the preceding
sections. It is also very similar to many models in the existing literature on mon-
etary policy; see the references in footnote 1, in particular Chapter 2 of Persson
and Tabellini (1990).
Again there is a continuum of citizens each having preferences over a public
good and a public bad, provided in quantities x respectively ¼. ¼ is now inter-
preted as the rate of in‡ation and x as the level of employment. These preferences
are described by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
Vi (¼; x) = ¡¼2 ¡ ¸i (x¡ x)2 : (0.36)
That is, citizen i ’s utility is decreasing in the rate of in‡ation and decreasing in
the deviation from an employment goal x > 0. The parameter ¸i is as before a
weight. The policymaker can control only ¼. However, by setting the in‡ation rate
di¤erent from the expected rate of in‡ation, ¼e, the policymaker can indirectly
a¤ect the level of employment. That is, the following expectations-augmented
Phillips curve is assumed:
x = ¯ (¼ ¡ ¼e)¡ "; (0.37)
where as before ¯ > 0 is a …xed parameter and " is a stochastic variable with zero
mean. The policymaker observes only a signal s, correlated with ". The expected
rate of in‡ation, ¼e, is given by
¼e = E";s (¼) ; (0.38)
that is, ¼e equals the expected value of the actual rate of in‡ation at the stage
where only the prior distribution of " and s is known. Equations (0.37) and (0.38)
and the fact that the policymaker but not the wage setters can observe the signal
s imply that the policymaker can stabilize employment by choosing to “surprise
in‡ate.”
All other notation and model features are identical to the model in Section 2.
In particular, the citizens have di¤erent weights ¸i. The timing is also the same.
That is, …rst the policymaker is elected, then he observes s, and …nally he decides
on ¼. Hence, the main di¤erence between the model described in this section and
the one in Section 2 is the form of the stochastic relationship between x and ¼,
given by equations (0.37) and (0.2) respectively.16
16The only other di¤erences are that in this section I have set ¼ = 0 and I require that x > 0.
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Substituting (0.37) into (0.36) yields
vi (¼; ") = ¡¼2 ¡ ¸i (¯ (¼ ¡ ¼e)¡ "¡ x)2
= ¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ [¼ ¡ (¯¼e + "+ x)' (¸i)]2 ¡ ¸i (¯¼e + "+ x)2
1 + ¸i¯
2 ;
(0.39)
where ' (¸i) is as de…ned in equation (0.5). Hence, exactly as in the model in Sec-
tion 2, the parameter ¸i measures i’s responsiveness to changes in the stochastic
variable ".
5.1. Analysis
Let us again denote the policymaker’s responsiveness parameter by ¸g. At the last
stage, the policymaker will implement the policy ¼ which maximizes his expected
utility conditional on his having observed the signal s:
max
¼
Z
vg (¼; ") f (" j s) d": (0.40)
Taking the …rst-order condition of this problem and then solving for ¼ yields
¼ =
¸g¯ [¯¼e + E (" j s) + x]
1 + ¸g¯
2 : (0.41)
The expected rate of in‡ation is obtained by taking expectations with respect to
s of both sides of equation (0.41), using the fact that Es (E (" j s)) = E (") = 0,
and then solving for ¼e. Doing this yields
¼e = ¸g¯x: (0.42)
Substituting this expression for ¼e into equation (0.41) in turn yields
¼¤g = ¸g¯x+ ' (¸g)E (" j s) : (0.43)
That is, on average, the equilibrium rate of in‡ation equals ¸g¯x, which typ-
ically is greater than zero — the ideal level according to equation (0.36). This
“in‡ationary bias” arises because an average in‡ation rate of zero is not credi-
ble (or time consistent). For at ¼ = 0, the marginal bene…t of surprise in‡ation
exceeds the marginal cost of in‡ation. For the marginal cost of in‡ation just to
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balance the marginal gain from an increase in employment, it must be that the
average in‡ation equals ¸g¯x. Thus, the zero rate of in‡ation would not be time
inconsistent if the employment goal were equal to the “natural” rate of employ-
ment, normalized to zero in equation (0.37).
The in‡ationary bias is also greater the greater the policymaker’s responsive-
ness parameter ¸g is. Thus, by electing a policymaker having a zero responsiveness
parameter, the electorate may eliminate the in‡ationary bias. However, such a
policymaker would not stabilize employment. Hence, the optimal trade-o¤ is to
delegate the task of conducting monetary policy to a policymaker having a re-
sponsiveness parameter that is positive but smaller than one’s own. This was
…rst shown by Rogo¤ (1985).17 The result is formally demonstrated in Lemma
2 below. Let us …rst, however, derive a citizen’s expected utility as to the stage
where neither " nor s can be observed.
Consider a citizen/voter with responsiveness parameter ¸i. His expected utility
from a policy maker with responsiveness parameter ¸g, denoted by Evi, may be
written as
Evi =
Z Z
vi (¼
¤; ") f ("; s) d"ds
= ¡ (¸g¯x)2 + ¸g¯
2½2¾2¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢2 £¸i ¡2 + ¸g¯2¢ ¡ ¸g¤ ¡ ¸i ¡x2 + ¾2¢
= ¡ (¸g¯x)2 + ½2¾2
¡
1 + ¸i¯
2
¢
' (¸g) [2' (¸i)¡ ' (¸g)]¡ ¸i
¡
x2 + ¾2
¢
(0.44)
That is, the expression for Evi is very similar to the expression for Eui in equation
(0.15). In fact, we have
@Eui
@½2
=
@Evi
@½2
(0.45)
and
@Eui
@¾2
=
@Evi
@¾2
: (0.46)
This means that the results stated in Proposition 1 and Observation 1 hold also in
this alternative model, where the relationship between x and ¼ is given by equation
(0.37) instead of equation (0.2). However, the derivatives of Eui and Evi with
respect to ¸g are not the same, which means that the incentives when electing a
policymaker di¤er between the models. This is illustrated by the following lemma.
17See footnote 6 though.
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Lemma 2. The policymaker’s responsiveness parameter ¸g is implicitly de…ned
by
x2¸g
¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢3
= ½2¾2 (¸m ¡ ¸g) : (0.47)
The result stated in Lemma 2 is a generalization of a result in Alesina and
Grilli (1992).18 Note that if we let x approach zero, then the median’s favorite is
¸g = ¸m. In general, as long as ½2 > 0, ¸g 2 (0; ¸m). Thus, the policymaker is
always less responsive than the median voter. However, when I now extend the
model, allowing for an endogenous degree of informativeness of the policymaker’s
signal, this result will be altered.
5.2. The signal’s informativeness being endogenous
Analogously to the analysis in Section 4, I now assume that the policymaker can
make a costly e¤ort and thereby improve upon the informativeness of the signal
that he observes. The acquisition of information is modeled exactly as in Section
4.
We can immediately conclude that Proposition 2 stated in Section 4 holds
also in this alternative model. This is because when equation (0.45) holds, the
marginal bene…t of making an e¤ort is the same in either model; hence, since also
the cost function is the same, a policymaker will make the same e¤ort in both
models. However, similarly to above, the incentives when electing a policymaker
di¤er between the models. This is shown in the remaining part of this subsection.
The policymaker’s expected utility at the stage where he is to choose the e¤ort
level e is given by
Eevg = Z Z vg (¼¤; ") f ("; s) d"ds¡ C (e)
= ¡ (¸g¯x)2 +
¸2g¯
2¾2e
1 + ¸g¯
2 ¡ ¸g
¡
x2 + ¾2
¢ ¡ C (e) (0.48)
The problem of maximizing Eevg with respect to e subject to the constraint e 2
[0; 1] has the same solution e¤ as the corresponding problem in Section 4. That
is, e¤ is implicitly de…ned by equation (0.23).
Now consider again a voter with responsiveness parameter ¸i. His expected
utility if the policymaker has responsiveness parameter ¸g and accordingly exerts
18Their result is obtained if one sets ¯ = ½2 = 1.
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e¤ort e¤ (¸g) may be written as
Eevi = ¡ (¸g¯x)2 + ¸g¯2e¤¾2¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢2 £¸i ¡2 + ¸g¯2¢ ¡ ¸g¤ ¡ ¸i ¡¾2 + x2¢ : (0.49)
As with the model considered in Section 4, one may show that su¢cient conditions
for Eevi to be single peaked in ¸g are that C (e) = ea for a 2 ¡1; 32¢ and that ¾2
is su¢ciently close to zero. Here I con…ne myself with showing that when single-
peakedness holds then, depending on parameter values, we may have any relation
between ¸g and ¸m.
When the median voter theorem applies, then the policymaker’s responsiveness
parameter ¸g is implicitly de…ned by the following identity:
¡2¯2x2¸g + 2¯e
¤¾2 (¸m ¡ ¸g)¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢3 + ¸g¯2¾2¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢2 £¸m ¡2 + ¸g¯2¢ ¡ ¸g¤ @e¤@¸g = 0:
(0.50)
The left-hand side of equation (0.50) was obtained by di¤erentiating Eevi with
respect to ¸g and evaluating at ¸i = ¸m. Inspecting equation (0.50), we can
identify three di¤erent e¤ects regarding the median voter’s incentives to appoint
a policymaker with certain preferences, each e¤ect corresponding to one of the
three terms of the left-hand side of equation (0.50). The …rst term is the only one
containing x, and it vanishes if x = 0. This term captures the “Rogo¤ e¤ect,”
i.e., the median voter’s incentives to appoint a policymaker that is less ‡exible
than himself, in order to mitigate the in‡ationary bias. The third term captures
the “information acquisition e¤ect.” If the condition ¸m
¡
2 + ¸g¯
2
¢
> ¸g is met,
then this e¤ect counteracts the Rogo¤ e¤ect; this condition, which is identical to
the condition in Proposition 1, guarantees that it is in the median voter’s interest
that the policymaker acquires more information. If we had x = @e
¤
@¸g
= 0, then
both the …rst and the third term would vanish, and we would reobtain the result
of Section 3, ¸g = ¸m.
To see when the information acquisition e¤ect is stronger than the Rogo¤
e¤ect, so that ¸m < ¸g, let us evaluate the left-hand side of the identity (0.50) at
¸m = ¸g. Doing this yields
¡2¸m¯2x2 + ¯
2¸2m¾
2
1 + ¸m¯
2
@e¤
@¸g
: (0.51)
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In order to have ¸m < ¸g, this expression must be greater than zero, or
@e¤
@¸g
>
2x2
¡
1 + ¸m¯
2
¢
¸m¾2
: (0.52)
Hence, if x is small relative to @e
¤
@¸g
, it may be that the median voter delegates the
task of conducting monetary policy to someone more responsive (or, in Rogo¤’s
(1985) terminology, less conservative) than himself.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has considered two models. In the …rst one, the policymaker de-
cides on the amount of a public good. This public good has an adverse e¤ect
on the environment, but the exact relationship between the public good and the
environment is unknown. The second model concerns monetary policy with ra-
tional expectations. Here there is some uncertainty about an additive term in
the expectations-augmented Phillips curve. In both models there is heterogeneity
among the citizens with respect to how serious an issue one thinks the environment
respectively full employment is — or, equivalently, concerning one’s responsiveness
to changes in the stochastic variable. Moreover, in both models, the policymaker
is elected among the citizens by a majority vote.
Concerning both models two questions were posed. First, would all citizens be
better o¤ ex ante if the policymaker, when making the decision, were having more
information about the realization of the stochastic variable? Second, would all
citizens be better o¤ ex ante if the variance of the stochastic variable were smaller?
The second question was studied in two di¤erent environments. In the …rst one
the policymaker can, prior to making the decision, observe a noisy signal about
the stochastic variable, and the informativeness of this signal is given exogenously.
In the second environment the policymaker can improve upon the informativeness
of the signal by making a greater e¤ort.
It was found that the answers to the questions are the same regardless which
one of the two models is considered. Concerning the …rst question it was shown
that only those citizens who are su¢ciently responsive to the stochastic variable
gain from a more informative signal. That is, the “non-environmentalists” or
the conservatives are worse o¤. However, it turns out that a majority of the
citizens are always better o¤ from the policymaker’s having access to a more
informative signal. Concerning the second question it was found that, in the
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environment where the signal’s informativeness is exogenous, everyone gains from
the variance of the stochastic variable being smaller. However, when the signal’s
informativeness is endogenous, those people who are su¢ciently responsive may
be worse o¤ from a smaller variance of the stochastic variable.
This paper has also considered another question, namely the relation between
the policymaker’s and the electorate’s degree of responsiveness. Speci…cally, it was
demonstrated that, in the environment where the policymaker can improve upon
the informativeness of the signal by making a greater e¤ort, a voter may have an
incentive to delegate the task of deciding on public policy to a policymaker that
is more responsive than himself. In particular, in the model on monetary policy,
this means that the rate of in‡ation will be set by someone less conservative than
the median voter.
1. Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
To be able to invoke the median voter theorem one must show that Eui is single
peaked in ¸g. Di¤erentiate Eui in (0.15) with respect to ¸g:
@Eui
@¸g
= ¡2 ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ hÃ0 (¸g) [Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸i)] + ¾2½2'0 (¸i) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸i)]i :
(1.1)
It is easy to check that '
0
> 0 and that Ã
0
has the same sign as (x¡ ¯¼).
By inspecting equation (1.1) one sees that regardless of the sign of Ã
0
we have:
@Eui
@¸g
> 0 for any ¸g < ¸i, @Eui@¸g < 0 for any ¸g > ¸i, and
@Eui
@¸g
= 0 for ¸g = ¸i.
Hence, Eui is single peaked in ¸g, and the peak is at ¸g = ¸i. ¤
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Di¤erentiating Eui in (0.15) with respect to ½2 and evaluating at ¸g = ¸m yield
@Eui
@½2
j¸g=¸m= ¡
¡
1 + ¸i¯
2
¢
¾2' (¸m) [' (¸m)¡ 2' (¸i)] ; (1.2)
which has the same sign as (2' (¸i)¡ ' (¸m)). By using the de…nition of ' and
by carrying out some algebra, one may show that (2' (¸i)¡ ' (¸m)) in turn has
the same sign as
³
¸i ¡ e¸´. ¤
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C. Proof of Observation 1
Di¤erentiatingEui in equation (0.15) with respect to ¾2 and evaluating at ¸g = ¸m
yield
@Eui
@¾2
j¸g=¸m= ¡½2' (¸m)
¡
1 + ¸i¯
2
¢
[' (¸m)¡ 2' (¸i)]¡ ¸i < 0 ,
' (¸i)
£
2¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1
¤
< ¯½2'2 (¸m) : (1.3)
If 2¯½2' (¸m) · 1, then clearly @Eui@¾2 j¸g=¸m< 0. Suppose that 2¯½2' (¸m) > 1.
Then inequality (1.3) may be rewritten as
' (¸i) <
¯½2'2 (¸m)
2¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1 : (1.4)
We must show that, when 2¯½2' (¸m) > 1, inequality (1.4) always holds. To see
that it does, note that the right-hand side of inequality (1.4) can be rewritten as
follows:
¯½2'2 (¸m)
2¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1 =
1
¯½2
"
[¯½2' (¸m)]
2
2¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1
#
=
1
¯½2
"
[¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1]2
2¯½2' (¸m)¡ 1 + 1
#
; (1.5)
which is greater than or equal to 1
¯
. On the other hand, the left-hand side of
inequality (1.4), ' (¸i), is strictly smaller than 1¯ . To see this, note that '
0
> 0
and lim¸i!1 ' (¸i) =
1
¯
. Hence inequality (1.4) must hold. ¤
D. Proof of the claim about single-peakedness in Section 4
Here I prove the claim made in Section 4 that Eeui is single peaked in ¸g if
C (e) = ea, a 2 ¡1; 3
2
¢
, x 6= ¯¼, and ¾2 is su¢ciently close to zero.
If C (e) = ea then e¤ is given by equation (0.32). It is a straightforward exercise
to show that, under the assumption a 2 ¡1; 3
2
¢
,
lim
¾2!0
e¤ = lim
¾2!0
@e¤
@¸g
= lim
¾2!0
@2e¤
@ (¸g)
2 = 0: (1.6)
Now di¤erentiate Eeui in equation (0.28) once with respect to ¸g:
@Eeui
@¸g
= ¡2 ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ hÃ0 (¸g) [Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸i)]
+e¤¾2'
0
(¸g) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸i)]
i
¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢¾2' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)] @e¤
@¸g
:
(1.7)
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Di¤erentiating Eeui once more yields:
@2Eeui
@¸2g
= ¡2 ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢ ·Ã00 (¸g) [Ã (¸g) ¡ Ã (¸i)] + hÃ0 (¸g)i2
e¤¾2
·
'
00
(¸g) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸i)] +
h
'
0
(¸g)
i2¸
+ 2¾2'
0
(¸g) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸i)] @e
¤
@¸g
¸
¡ ¡1 + ¸i¯2¢¾2' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)] @2e¤
@¸2g
: (1.8)
The assumption x 6= ¯¼ implies that Ã0 (¸g) 6= 0. This means that @Eeui@¸g = 0 if
and only if
[Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸i)] = ¡¾
2
2Ã
0
(¸g)
h
2e¤'
0
(¸g) [' (¸g)¡ ' (¸i)]
+' (¸g) [' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)] @e
¤
@¸g
¸
´ £ ¡¾2¢ (1.9)
Substituting [Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸i)] for£ (¾2) in equation (1.8) and then taking the limit
¾2 ! 0 yield
lim
¾2!0
@2Eeui
@¸2g
j[Ã(¸g)¡Ã(¸i)]=£(¾2)= ¡2
¡
1 + ¸i¯
2
¢ h
Ã
0
(¸g)
i2
< 0: (1.10)
By continuity, @
2Eeui
@¸2g
evaluated at [Ã (¸g)¡ Ã (¸i)] = £ (¾2) is strictly negative
also for some strictly positive ¾2, which proves the claim. ¤
E. Proof of Proposition 2
Di¤erentiating Eeui (¸g) in equation (0.28) with respect to ¾2 (and making use of
equation (0.27)) yield
@Eeui
@¾2
= ¡' (¸g)
¡
1 + ¸i¯
2
¢
[' (¸g)¡ 2' (¸i)]Z ¡ ¸i: (1.11)
Thus, @Eeui
@¾2
< 0 is equivalent to
' (¸i) [2¯Z' (¸g)¡ 1] < ¯Z [' (¸g)]2 : (1.12)
If 2¯Z' (¸g) · 1, then clearly @Eeui@¾2 < 0. Suppose that 2¯Z' (¸g) > 1. Then we
may rewrite inequality (1.12) as (0.31). ¤
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F. Proof of Lemma 2
I …rst show that Evi is single peaked in ¸g. Di¤erentiate Evi once with respect
to ¸g:
@Evi
@¸g
= ¡2¸g¯2x2 + 2¯
2½2¾2 (¸i ¡ ¸g)¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢3 : (1.13)
And once more:
@2Evi
@¸2g
= ¡2¯2x2 ¡ 2¯2½2¾2 1 + ¸g¯
2 + 3¯2 (¸i ¡ ¸g)¡
1 + ¸g¯
2
¢4 : (1.14)
Note that when @Evi
@¸g
= 0, we must have ¸i > ¸g. Thus, when evaluated at
values of ¸g satisfying @Evi@¸g = 0, the second derivative
@2Evi
@¸2g
is strictly negative.
Hence Evi is single peaked in ¸g, and we can apply the median voter theorem.
¸g is accordingly given by the median citizen’s favorite. That is, ¸g is de…ned by
(0.47). ¤
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